Africa’s multilateral institutions were established to drive democratic renewal, good governance and economic progress, yet they have increasingly become arenas of rhetoric rather than effective action. The African Union (AU) and regional bodies such as SADC, ECOWAS, EAC, COMESA and IGAD were conceived as safeguards against autocracy, military rule and constitutional abuse. Instead, they have often equivocated in the face of repression, hesitated during conflict and normalised democratic decline, eroding public trust at home and weakening Africa’s moral standing in the global stage.
This institutional frailty is stark in conflict management. The Tigray war, which erupted in November 2020, exposed the AU’s reluctance to confront powerful member states despite grave humanitarian consequences, including mass displacement and severe suffering. In Sudan, instability has persisted since the October 2021 coup that derailed the civilian transition. Rival generals continue their power struggle while mediation efforts yield little progress. Regional statements abound, but enforcement is absent. The AU Peace and Security Council has struggled to take decisive preventive action, demonstrating that mediation without leverage is little more than ritual.
Electoral governance, the foundation of democratic legitimacy, reveals similar weaknesses. In Kenya, repeated disputed elections, court battles and episodic violence highlight deep mistrust in electoral institutions and elite bargains presented as reform. Since the return of multiparty politics in the early 1990s, only the 2002 presidential election has been widely accepted as free and fair; subsequent polls have frequently been marked by unrest, displacement and deaths.
Uganda’s political space remains constrained by prolonged incumbency, securitised governance and suppression of dissent. Tanzania, once praised for stability, has in recent years restricted opposition activity and media freedoms, with reforms yet to translate into firm guarantees. Regional observer missions often respond with cautious language and diplomatic euphemism, avoiding forthright condemnation. Observation without consequence risks becoming complicity.
The resurgence of coups in the Sahel further underscores democratic regression. Since 2020, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have experienced military takeovers, testing ECOWAS and AU mechanisms designed to deter unconstitutional changes of government. Although Burkina Faso’s current military ruler, Ibrahim Traoré, is praised by some for a reformist posture, rule obtained through a coup undermines democratic prospects and the aspirations of the Burkinabè people.
At the heart of these failures lies a structural contradiction: organisations composed of incumbent leaders are expected to hold those same leaders accountable. Many heads of state, themselves governing under fragile mandates or controversial constitutional manoeuvres, are reluctant to empower supranational bodies that could later censure them. The principle of non-interference persists through elite solidarity, where peer review becomes peer protection.
Leadership at the continental level has also faced scrutiny. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf of Djibouti was elected Chairperson of the AU Commission on 16 February 2025, defeating Kenya’s veteran opposition figure Raila Odinga. His election raised hopes for renewed commitment to institutional integrity and democratic norms. Yet many observers believe his tenure has begun hesitantly, at a time when Africans seek firm, principled and courageous leadership.
These concerns intensified after Tanzania’s 29 October 2025 general election, during which major opposition candidates were barred and political restrictions imposed. Protests followed, and human rights groups reported lethal force by security forces between 29 October and 3 November. Despite the AU Observer Mission concluding that the election did not meet AU principles or international standards, AU leadership congratulated President Samia Suluhu Hassan, prompting questions about consistency and credibility.
Regional leadership has faced similar criticism. Julius Maada Bio of Sierra Leone at ECOWAS and Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa at SADC are seen by some as insufficiently assertive in defending democratic norms among member states. Observers argue that stronger censure might have been expected over alleged electoral malpractice within the region. One wonders why South Africa has taken a firm stance against Israel over the alleged genocide in Gaza yet has failed to speak with equal clarity about the crises and governance failures on the African home front.
Uganda’s January 2026 election reinforced these concerns. President Yoweri Museveni secured another term amid opposition allegations of intimidation and irregularities. Opposition leader Bobi Wine rejected the results, security forces reportedly raided his residence, and tensions rose. On 17 January 2026, the AU Commission Chairperson commended the election and congratulated Museveni, a move critics viewed as legitimising a contested process. Veteran opposition figure Kizza Besigye remains detained on treason charges amid reports of ill health, drawing limited regional protest, though Kenyan lawyer Martha Karua has supported his defence.
Restoring democratic credibility requires practical reforms. Electoral rules, term limits and prohibitions on unconstitutional power seizures must trigger automatic consequences such as suspension or sanctions. Observer missions should become rigorous, evidence-based exercises with honest reporting. Conflict mediation needs stronger security tools, early-warning systems and clear intervention thresholds when governments fail to protect citizens.
Regional bodies must widen participation beyond heads of state to include civil society, judiciaries, legal professionals, journalists and young people. Financial independence through transparent member-state funding is equally vital, ensuring accountability to African citizens rather than external donors.
Africa’s standing will not be restored through declarations alone but through consistent defence of constitutionalism, credible elections and rejection of military rule. As past Pan-African leaders such as Nyerere, Nkrumah, Lumumba and Kaunda embodied, principled leadership rooted in dignity, unity and social justice remains essential.
By strengthening institutions, protecting liberties, curbing corruption and pursuing equitable reform, African leaders can rebuild legitimacy and restore the continent’s political and moral stature.
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